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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to declare certain notes in default
and to foreclose a security interest held by the plaintiffrespondent in the real and personal property which constitutes the defendant-appellants mink ranch, located on
Saratoga Road near Lehi, Utah and a mortgage on defendants,
Sylvia Woolsey's home.

The appellants claim that the trial

court erred in several respects in granting judgment in
favor of the plaintiff-respondent and that .the trial judge
erred in ruling that the plaintiff-respondent had not acted
wrongfully in declaring a default and having a receiver appointed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a trial on the merits, the trial court entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which allowed the
plaintiff-respondent to foreclose its security interests.

'1'he

trial court had previously permitted the ex parte appointment
of a receiver, who has continued in possession of the property until a sale was held pursuant to the foreclosure decree.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to have this Court reverse certain
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the trial
and to
judgment
against
and
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the appellants or, in the alternative, to remand this matte:
to the trial court for further hearings on the matter

A

• P·
pellants request this Court to order that the issues of fact
in the further hearings be heard and decided by a jury,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants, Ralph O. Woolsey and Sylvia Grossgebauer Woolsey, were the owners and operators of a mink ranch
near Lehi, Utah.

To finance the expansion and operation of

the mink ranch, the appellants had obtained several loans
from the respondent, the State Bank of Lahi.

I

The loans in

question were made on June 19, 1974, July 3, 19 7 5, and Decetj
12, 1975.

The appellants pledged all of the personal and

r~~

property which constituted the mink ranch as security for
these loans.

I

In addition, Mrs. Woolsey' s interest in a

home in Provo, Utah, was mortgaged as additional security
for the 1974 loan.

The parties disagree as to the terms for I

the release of the security interest in that home.
In December of 1975, approximately 981 mink pelts were
stolen from the Woolsey ranch.

These pelts were insured

and the insurance proceeds have subsequently been paid.
On January 2, 1976, the Bank obtained the appointment
of a receiver to take possession of the mink ranch and to
manage it.

This was done at an ex parte hearing and no noti'

was given to the appellants prior to the receiver's arrival
at the ranch to take possession.

The appointment of the

receiver was based on the Bank's declaration of default on
·
due to the theft
the grounds that it deemed itsel f insecure
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no valid basis for the default or the appointment of the
receiver and that the same were not done in good faith.
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
The appellants argue on appeal that the trial court
erred as a matter of law in striking their demand for a
jury trial and in ordering appellant Sylvia Woolsey's testimony concerning fraud stricken from the record as violative
of the parol evidence rule.

The appellants also argue that

the trial court erred in failing to find that the parties
had agreed to extend the payment of the $115,000 note to March
1, 1976, erred in finding that the plaintiff properly accelerated the payments due under the notes, and that the
defendants (appellants} had not established a lack of good
faith in declaring a default under the security agreement.
Appellants believe that all of the factual findings were
against the clear weight of the evidence.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL.
On June 9, 1976, the trial court granted the plaintiff's
motion to strike the defendants' demand for a jury trial.
(R. 57) The order granting the motion gave the following as

the grounds for denying the defendants their right to a jury
trial:

This Order is based upon the finding by
this Court that the issues to be decided are
largely equitable and arise from an interpretation of written contracts and therefore the
defendants are not entitled to a jury trial.
(R. 57)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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As the appellants will show, this finding was erroneous
the trial court improperly precluded the defendants -appe1.
lants from presenting their case to a jury.
A review of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Iov
entered in this action will readily disclose that the great;,
number of issues in this matter were factual and not equital'
in nature.

(R. 43-49) The findings of fact, seventeen in

number, take approximately four full pages to enumerate,
while the conclusions of law, ten in number, take only two
and a half.

Not only are the factual issues more numerous,

but their determination is the crucial factor in this case
and the conclusions of law are merely subsidiary to those
fact questions.
1.

This is illustrated by the following exampl

As shown in Point II, it was an essential fact

question whether or not the parties had made an oral agree·
ment to extend the time for payment of the $l15, 000 note to
March 1, 1976.

This fact was critical to the determination

of the respondent's rights to declare the notes in default
as ruled in Findings 2ta) and 9.
The existence of such an agreement was obviously, a
fact question to be decided by a jury.

This matter was not

"entirely founded in the interpretation of legal documents',
or in giving legal effect to such instruments.

There were

valid fact questions in this case which the appellants were
constitutionally and statutorily entitled to have submitted
a jury.
2.

U.C.A. §78-21-2 (1953).
The findings of fact concerning the

ment of the mink ranch and the other grounds

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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alleged by the Bank were obviously important in determining
whether or not it had acted in good faith in declaring the
notes to be in default and in having a receiver appointed.
3.

The most important determination made by the trial

court was a fact question; i.e. did the Bank act in good
faith in declaring the debtors (appellants) to be in default?
This issue is determinative of most of the important issues
in this case.
The question of good faith in accelerating notes which
are due "on or before" a certain date (as are those in this
case} has always been a jury question under the provisions
of the u.c.c.

Although this issue has not been treated by

the Utah Supreme Court, the courts of other states appear to
be unanimous in this matter. In Fort Knox National Bank
v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196 (1964), the Kentucky Court of
Appeals ruled that the question of "good faith"-. under the
section in question (analogue to u.c.A.

§70A~l-208)

is

required to be submitted to the jury unless there is no
competent evidence to support such a finding.

Universal C.I.T

Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 329 N.E.2d 620 (Ind. 1975) also
recognizes that the question of good faith is a jury question.
Because this fact question, as well as the others listed
above, was of such crucial importance in the resolution of
this matter, the appellants assert that the trial court's
ruling was clearly erroneous and that the appellants were
wrongfully denied their right to a jury trial.
The right to a jury trial has always been jealously
Sponsored guarded
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trial court ignored firm precedent in striking their demand
for a J'ury trial.

The appell an t s b e l'ieve that the case of

Petty v. Clark, 102 Utah 186, 129 P.2d 568 (1942) is controlling in this matter and that the rationale of that case
affirms the appellants' argument that they were entitled to
a jury trial.

In the Petty case, there was only one fact is.

raised in a foreclosure action, which is similar to the
facts in the present case except that there were fewer fact
issues.

In Petty, the history of equitable and legal

pleadings were reviewed and then this Court found that the
existence of one fact issue was enough to entitle the defen·
dant to a jury trial:
At common law, law and equity were administered
by different courts. In courts of law, the parties were entitled to a jury to determine issues
of fact, but in courts which administered equity,
.there was no jury. Often the courts of equity
required parties to litigate certain issues in
the law courts before equity would intervene,
and in many instances it required two suits to
determine what is now determined in only one
suit.
Under the common-law system, two suits
would have been required to determine this
action:
(1) a suit in the law court to deterrnind the amount owing under the contract; (2)
if the judgment for that amount were not paid,
the plaintiff would be required to go into a
court of equity to foreclose the defendant's
equity of redemption.

Under the Utah Constitution and Statutes,
there is but one form of civil action-the same
court administers both law and equity, often in
the same action. Constitution of Utah, Article
VIII §19; Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 1041-2. In order to prevent more than one action
in the foreclosure of mortgages, the legislature
in 104-55-1 expressly provides: "There can be
but one action for the recovery of any debt or
the enforcement of any right secured by mortonsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servi
gage*
* *·"
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The legi~lature thus contemplated the joining of an ac~ion at law and a suit in equity in
the same action.

* * *

In ~he present case the only disputed issue
of fact in the case, and the one which was submitted to the jury, is whether the interest paragraph was a part of the contract when it was delivered. That issue was a part of plaintiff's
main action to recover money owing under the contract, which action is clearly an action at law.
The mere fact that plaintiff demanded equitable
relief, to wit: the foreclosure of his lienwould not deprive the defendant of his right to
have the issue of fact determined by a jury.
This holding directly opposes the holding of the trial court
on this issue.

(R. 241-242).

In light of the facts that

there were many factual issues in this case and tllat these
were the predominant issues, this rationale is clearly
applicable and demonstrates the error of the trial court in
striking the defendants' demand for a jury.
The Petty decision is clearly in line with other Utah
cases which have consistently protected a citizens' riqht to
a jury trial.

Several of these cases have held that the

right to a jury trial should be scrupulously guarded.

See

e.g. Butz v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 233 P. 2d 332 (Utah
1951) and Stickle v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 251 P.2d H7
(Utah 1952) •

In the latter case, this Court gave the basis

for the preservation of these rights:

In our democratic system, the people are the
repository of power whence the law is derived; from its initiation and creation to
its final application and enforcement, the
law is the expression of their will. The
functioning of a cross-section of the citizenry as a jury is the method by whi~h t~e
people express this will in the applicatio~
of law to controversies which arise under it.
Both our constitutional and statutory proviSponsored by the S.J.
Quinney
Law Library.
Fundingby
for digitization
by the Institute
of Museum and Library Service
sions
assure
trial
jury toprovided
citizens
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Co~ts,

as final arbiters of law,

coul~

rogate to themselves arbitrary and dangerous
powers ~y pr~s:iming to determine questions of
fact whi~h ~itigants have a right to have passed
upon by.Ju~ies. Part of the merit of the jury
system is its safeguarding against such arbitrary power in the courts. To the great credit
of the courts of this country, they have been
extremely reluctant to infringe upon this right
and by leaving it unimpaired have kept the ad- '
ministration of justice close to the people.

This rationale and holding of this case are found repeatedlr'
in other Utah cases.

See Abdulkadir v. Wes tern Pacific Rail'

road, 7 U.2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957); Holland v. Wilson, a

U.2d 11, 327 P.2d 250 (1958); Valley Mortuary v.
Fairba~,1

225 P.2d 739 (Utah 1950); and Corbet v. Cox, 30 U.2d 361, :
517 P.2d 1318 (1974). Even though some of these cases uphell
summary judgments or other judicial acts which would take
the determination of a case from the jury, all of them gav€
the same standard.
It is important to note that in this case the parties
had progressed for four months in this case before the
plaintiff made its motion to strike the defendant's request
for a jury. The motion was made after the pre-trial conference had been held and the court had issued a Pre-Trial
Order dated March 12, 1976, which clearly anticipatedaj~
trial in this matter.

(R. 74).

It was months later that th!

plaintiff made its motion to strike the defendants' demand.
It would seem to the appellants that such conduct approxi·
mates a waiver of any objection.
In summary, the appellants believe that the trial cour:
· error when ~~t struck the defendants' request
was clearly in
for a jury trial.

That action was erroneous because there

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-8- errors.
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were many issues of fact which the defendants were entitled
to have decided by a jury and because the fact issues were
clearly the major issues in this trial, even though the
action was nominally an equitable one.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
PARTIES HAD ORALLY AGREED TO EXTEND THE DUE DATE OF THE
$115,000 NOTE TO MARCH 1, 1976.
The first fact issue to be considered will be whether
or not the parties reached an oral agreement in July of 1975
to extend the due date for a $115,000 note to March 1, 1976.
This note was originally executed on June 19, 1974, and was
due on or before February 20, 1975.
115}

(Plaintiff's Ex. 9, R.

This question will be considered first because its

resolution is fundamental to the succeeding points.
The appellants believe that the evidence at the hearing
of January 16, 1976 and at trial clearly showed that an oral
agreement was reached in July of 1975 which gave the defendants until March 1, of 1976 to pay a previously executed
and overdue note in the amount of $115,000.

This contention

is based on several elements of testimony .and evidence:
1.

The testimony of the respondent-Bank's president,

Calvin H. Swenson.
2.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, which is a security agree-

ment dated July 3, 1975.
3.

(R. 123-124)

The testimony of the defendants, Ralph O. Woolsey

and Sylvia W. Woolsey.
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probably the strongest support of the appellants• argUJUent,
Mr. Swenson is the president of the State Bank of Lehi {the
plaintiff in this action) and was the person with whom the
plaintiffs had dealt for several years in obtaining loans
for the construction and operation of their mink ranch, ~
his deposition, which was taken on March 11, 1976, Mr.
Swenson clearly admits that the date of March 1, 1976, was
established as the date for payment of the new note for
$45,000 as.well as the old one for $115,000:
Q. Was any mention made at this time of the
$115,000 note?

I don't recall the specific mention, but
they were aware that there was still a carryover of $111,000 and that this was just in
addition just to tide them through in the operations this year.
A.

And was it the position of the bank at
this time that the $115,000 note and the
$45,000 note would then all be due at the
same time?
Q.

Well, it was our intention that the $115,000 note - - it was our knowledge that that
was past due and we agreed to carry that with
them in its present state until such time as
he could effect the refinancing.
A.

Q.

Was the target date for that March 1, 1976?

Well, we assumed that it would be necessary
to get the mink pelts sold in order to know at
that point just how we stood.

A.

Q.

Is that why the March 1st date was arrived

at?
A.

Yes.

Q. Was it because of your past experienc~hthat
you knew that once the pelts are sent to
e
market, it takes a period of time befor; they're
sold and before you get your money back.

That's
right.
And
it by
~as
Mr. Woolsey's
in- Services
Sponsored by the S.J. QuinneyA.
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tention to send the mink so they'd get in on
the early sale.
Q.

And the early sale is the January sale?

A.

Yes.

Did you know that when the mink go in the
January sale, that it is generally in mid or
late February before payments are received?

Q.

A. That's why we set the March 1st date.
(emphasis added) (R. 125, pp. 52-53, and
R. 294-296).
Although Mr. Swenson attempted to hedge and. qualify these
answers at trial, it is obvious from the deposition testimany that the Woolseys were given until March 1,

~976, to·
~ •··,

t

repay all of the loans through receipt of incGJRe and by

.

..
~

additional financing from other sources. (R. 136-137) .lk.
Swenson tried to state at trial that the loan was to kaYe
been refinanced during the pelting season. Such a statement
is unreasonable in light of the fact that Mr. Swenson knew
that the mink sale monies would not be received until late·
February or early March and that it was highly unlikely that
;,;,!)

any institution would provide financing until. the outstanding.
··~·-. !.. .l·

l

debt had been reduced by payments from the sale receipts.
(See Swenson's testimony, R. 295-296).

The predisposition of

the trial. judge was evident from his statements at the first: ..
hearing, which occurred before the issue was ever in questioa.
(R. 210-211).

Thus, the right to a jury trial was clearly

essential.
The appellants' contention is also supported by the
Security Agreement which was executed by the parties on July
3, 1975.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, also reproduced at R. 123-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
..:11Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

This agreement specified that it is to secure the

124)

payment of the old and new loans, including the $115,ooo
note which had been overdue since February 20, 1975. (R.
It is of critical importance to note that the bank

115).

did not foreclose the $115,000 note in July of 1975, but
chose instead to loan the appellants another $51,000 fortli
coming year.

Both of the new notes which were executed

pursuant to this Security Agreement were due on March 1,
1976, which was the date Mr. Swenson testified was the

target date for refinancing.
Both of the defendants testified that an express oral
agreement was entered into which gave the Woolsey$ until
March 1 to pay off the loan which was overdue.

Mr. Woolseil

testified that Mr. Swenson agreed to extend the due date of
the "big loan" to the time when the new, $45,000 note woulc

!

be due (R. 350) and that the Bank was willing to work with
him one hundred percent (R. 185) and Mrs. Woolsey testifi~1
that the old note "would be extended for a year with the nJ
note".

{R.

468) •

Both of the defendants testified that 1111

collateral was pledged as consideration for the extension.

CR. 351, 468).
Appellants contend that, inasmuch as the above three
witnesses were the only ones that testified concerning the
transactions of the parties, their testimony obviously
constitutes the clear weight of the evidence and that such
evidence clearly showed that the Bank (thr ough Mr. Swenson!
granted the Woolseys until March 1, 1976 to obtain

and
to Law
payLibrary.
offFunding
the for
$115,000
which
nsored by the S.J.
Quinney
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several years.

The failure of the trial court to so find is

clearly error and, because such a finding would substantially
affect the other findings in the matter, the failure constitutes reversible error by the trial court.
The appellants believe that the majority of legal
authorities support the propriety of such a mutual extension
agreement.
~·

Anderson in his treatise, the Uniform Commercial

states, on page 659 of §3-109:19, that a contract for

extension of time may be either written or oral.

11 Am.Jur2d,

Bills and Notes, §298, p. 326 states that such an agreement
is a separate contract and is governed by the law of contract
and is not regulated by the Uniform Commercial Code.

The

appellants contend that the evidence establishes such a
contract and that the consideration for the extension was
furnished by the additional collateral which was listed in
the 1975 security agreement.
Appellants believe that the above.clearly shows that
the parties agreed to extend the due date for the $115,000
note to March 1, 1976, and that such an extension is clearly
legal.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
PROPERLY ACCELERATED THE PAYMENTS DUE UNDER THE NOTES AND
THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD NOT ESTABLISHED A LACK OF GOOD FAITH
IN DECLARING A DEFAULT UNDER THE SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Having previously established that the parties had
reached an agreement which made all of the notes due on
1976,
the appellants
nowprovided
desire
toInstitute
showof Museum
that the
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plaintiff-respondent had no right to accelerate the date
payment of the notes and that their actions in so
not in good faith as required by Utah statute and general
case law.
The first issue concerns the right of the respondent,
State Bank of Lehi, to accelerate the notes and to declare
them due and owing on January 2, 1976.

(See the complaint

in this action, R. 113).
Both the testimony at trial and the great weight of
legal authority show that notes such as those in this acfa
are not demand notes.

The Secured Promissory Notes which

were executed on July 3 , 19 7 5 (for $ 4 5, 0 0 0) and on December
12, 1975 (for $6,000) stated that they were payable "on or
before March 1, 1976".

The great majority of jurisdiction;
I

which have ruled on such notes have held they they are not
demand notes but, rather, that they are notes which are due
on a date certain.

See e • g • Mecham v. United States Bank

of Arizona, 107 Ariz. 437, 489 P.2d 247 (1971) which statee
that "when a note, such as this one, provides for payment 1
or before a stated date, i t is payable at a definite time'.
To the same effect is Ferri v. Sylvia, 214 A.2d 470 (R.I.
1965) which states that "at the law merchant it was gener ·
settled that a promissory note or a bill of exchange payal~
'on or before' a specified date fixed with certainty the
time of payment" and then cites five other cases from as
many jurisdictions as authority for that proposition. ~u
is established in Utah under U .C .A. §70A-3-109 (a) which
states:
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r

~

70A-3-109. Definite time. - (1) An instrument
is payable at a definite time by its terms it
is payable
(a) on or before a stated date or at a fixed
period after a stated date; • • ·•
These authorities clearly establish that the notes for $45,000
and $6,000 were not due until March 1, 1976, contrary to the
allegations contained in the respondent's complaint. (R. 110-111)
For the reasons set forth in Point I above and because the
payment of the $115,000 note was tied to the other notes,
the appellants believe that it too was due "on or before"
March 1, 1976 and was thus not due and owing on January 2,
1976.
The only basis that the respondent could have for
declaring the notes due would be the assertion that the
notes were in default. Paragraph 8 of the Security Agreement
dated July 3, 1975 sets forth the grounds for the declaration
of default. (R. 124).

Although the Conclusions of Law

flatly state that "the plaintiff did exercise good faith in
accelerating said payments and all notes are in default and
due and payable in full,"

(R. 4 7) the only speci.fication of

the grounds for the default which are found in .the Record on
Appeal are set out in the plaintiff-respondent's Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Strike Demand for Jury Trial. {R.
71)

These are:
ll)
"Debtor fails to pay any of the Obligations
when due;"

(4)
"Debtor becomes insolvent or unable to pay
debts as they mature."

.

;10)

"Any of the Collateral is lost, stolen,

S.J.
Law Library.damaged;"
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lll)
"Bank shall deem itself insecure f
reason whatsoever. 11
or any
As explained above, ground #1 and the second h

alf of i4 are

inapplicable because the obligations did not become due
until March 1, 1976, the date of maturi"ty of

the notes.

first part of #4 cannot reasonably be advanced by th

The

e res-

pondent because the defendants-appellants were more insolv
on January 2, 1976 than they were when the notes were executed.

It was always known by the Bank that the appellants

were heavily financed for the purpose of expanding and
establishing their mink ranch.

The Bank acknowledged that

they knew in July of 1975 that the Woolseys were indebted
and that this would be the last year that the Bank-would
carry them.

(R. 294-295).

Subparagraph (10) of the default provision states that
the debtor shall be in default if "any of the collateral is
lost, stolen or materially damaged."

While the appellants

admit that some 968 mink pelts were stolen in late December
of 1975, they believe that the facts will demonstrate the
unreasonableness of employing this provision as the basis
for a default.
facts:

This allegation is based on the following

pursuant to the requirements of Paragraph 6 of the

Security Agreements, 1 all of the stolen pelts were insurea

This paragraph reads as follows:
6. INSURANCE: Debtor
agreed, at his expense, to insure the Collateral against 1
damage, theft (and such other risk as Bank may requir~) to.
the full insurable value therof with insurance companies an:
under policies and in form satisfactory to Bank. Proceeds
insurance shall be payable to Bank as its interest may ap
and all policies shall provide for 10 days minimum writ~
cellation notice to Bank. Upon request, policies or cer
attesting, the coverage shall be deposited with Bank. I
may Funding
be applied
byprovided
Bankbytoward
ofLibrary
any Service
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and the Bank knew that its interests were insured and that
the insurance payments would be made to the Bank. (.R, 139
and 355).

Because the theft of the insured pelts in no way

diminished the value of the secured property, the Bank cannot
use this as a valid basis to declare the notes in default
and accelerate their payment.

This is in accordance with

the general rules of equity which apply to these Code provision
as well as all others.

U.C.A. §78-1-103.

The only real issue which was addressed at trial and in
the other hearings was whether the Bank could validly accelerate
the notes by reason of the insecurity provision contained
in Subparagraph lll) of the Default par.agraph. in the Securit:y
Agreement.

That provision states that default may be4eclared

if the "Bank shall deem itself insecure for any reason
whatsoever".

For the following reasons, the appellants

believe that the Bank had no valid basis under this provision to accelerate this payments due under the notes and
that its actions in attempting to do so evidence a lack of
the required good faith.
The provisions of the Commercial Code Title of the Utah
Code superimpose a duty of good faith on the arbitrary right
of a secured party to accelerate note payments due to insecurity.
This provision is found in U.C.A. §70A-l-208.

This statute

reads as follows:

A term providing that one party or his successor
in interest may accelerate payment. or.performance
or require collateral or additio~al coll~tera~ •at
will" or "when he deems himself insecure or in
words or similar import shall be construed to mean
that he shall have power to do so only if he in
good faith believes that the prospect of payment
Sponsored by theor
S.J. performance
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,

lishing lack of good faith is on the party against
whom the power has been exercised.
The purposes of this language is clearly stated by this

Comment of the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code:
'!he increased use of acceleration clauses either
in the case of sales on credit or in time paper
or in security transactions has lead to some confusion in the cases as to the effect to be given
to a clause which seemingly grants the power of an
acceleration at the whim and caprice of one party
This section is intended to make clear that despite
language which can be so construed and. which further might be held to make the agreement void as
against public policy or to make the contract
illusory or too indefinite for enforcement, the
clause means that the option is to be. exercised
only in the good faith belief that the prospect
of payment or performan~e is .impaired. (Emphasis
added).
This Court has recently interpretted §70A-l-208

for~

first. time in the case of Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d
1145 (1976}.

Appellants believe that the trial court igno1

the holding and rationale of this case and, in so doing,
reached an inequitable result that has achieved the harsh
results that the Williamson decision had hoped to avoid.

Appellants believe that the present case is very similar io

many aspects to the Williamson case and that the holding an

rules of that decision should have been applied in the tria
of this case.

A review of that decision will reveal the

incorrectness of the trial court's rulings.

In the Williamson decision, this Court recognized the
harshness of acceleration clauses without notice:

The clause which allows for acceleration in case
of default, if strictly enforced, is ~ ~eve7e covenant the invocation of which has similarity
to oth~r forfeitures. The imposition of such severe
conditions is not favored in the law; and the one~,
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or omission permit another to assume that. the covenant will not be strictly enforced, then "crack
down" on the obligor by rigidly insisting on enforcement, without giving some reasonable notice
and opportunity to comply. This is a doctrine of
equity which is firmly established in our law by
numerous decisions. 545 P.2d at 1147.
This Court noted that these severe sanctions have long been
disfavored under Utah law and noted the case of Jensen v. Nielsen,
26 U.2d 96, 485 P.2d 673 (1971) and other cases cited therein
as ample support for that proposition.

In the present case,

the Bank accelerated the note without notice and obtained
the appointment of a receiver ex parte, thus causing irreparable harm to the appellants and precluding the appellants
from obtaining financing from other sources, thus· effectively
destroying the defendants' lifesavings and an investment of
many years duration which has now been dismantled and sold
at far less than market value due to ineffective management
by the receivers which were appointed pursuant to the Bank's
request.

The testimony at trial clearly established that

the appellants had made arrangements for additional.financing
from Mr. Harvey Carson and others and that the premature and
unexpected attachment by the Bank destroyed any of these
possibilities. (R. 360, 394, 422)
In interpretting the good faith requirements of

u.c.A.

§70A-l-208, this Court made the following statement:
It seems to recognize that acceleration is a
harsh remedy which should be allowed only if
there is some reasonable justification for doing
so, such as a good faith belief that the prospect of payment is impaired. 545 P.2d at 1149.
In the present case, appellants assert that no valid basis
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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existed for the acceleration of the notes.

Mr. Calvin

Swenson, the Bank's president, admitted in the hearing on
January 16, 1976, that the Bank was "principally concerned'
with the theft (R. 137) but he and his counsel openly ackn~
that the stolen mink were insured (R. 139-140, and 355) and
the trial court found that this fact was not disputed,
355)

(R,

Because the stolen pelts were insured, the Bank cannm

assert this as a valid basis for. feeling insecure and
because the Bank has now received the insurance proceeds, it
can hardly be heard to rebut this argument.
other bases were similarly improper:

All of the

the Campbell mink wen

fed by feed supplied by Campbell (R. 385, 409); no

~vidence

was ever introduced to support the findings that defendant
Ralph Woolsey threatened bankruptcy; the marital problems ol
the defendants were admitted to have been known prior wili
execution of the July, 1975 loans (R. 292); and the clear
weight of the evidence showed. that defendant Ralph Woolsey
was caring for his mink ranch in a good husbandry fashion
at all times.

(R. 166-169, 174-175, 386, 418 and 453) All

I

of these allegations appear to have been manufactured after
the original allegations were ascertained to be unsupportiw
of the insecurity allegations.

All of this testimony reve

that the trial court erred in appointing the receivers and
in issuing the findings that it did.

These actions were iD

direct opposition to the direction of this court in the
Williamson decision when it spoke of equitable principles
and guidelines:
The rules of equity arose as a means of avoid-
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nes~

of some of the rules and remedies of law.
It is also to be observed that the differences
between law and equity are not so distinct as
they were in former times. The lines between
them have become blurred and they have become
for the most part blended together in what we
refer to generally as equity and justice. our
Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 19, provided:
"There shall be but one form of civil action,
and law and equity may be administered in the
same action."
Consistent with the foregoing, equitable
claims or defenses may be asserted. and tried
along with or against legal claims or defenses
in the same action; and equitable principles may
be applied in an action at law. We can see no
reason why the doctrine we have just spoken of
as being rooted in equity and good conscience
should have any affinity for, or limitation in
application to, any particular type. of conduct
or controversy. The principles or equity and
justice are universal; they apply wherever appropriate and necessary to enforce .rights or to
prevent oppression and injustice. (Emphasis
added) 545 P.2d at 1148.
A last comment must be made concerning the lack of a

demand for payment in this matter.

As the trial testimony

showed, the defendants had arranged for financing from other
sources. (R. 360, 394 and 422) The ex parte action of the
plaintiff in having a receiver appointed destroyed these
arrangements and caused irrevocable harm.

This is contrary

to direction of this Court in the Williamson decision:
The question arises as to how the defendants
would know that condition came about unless
someone so advised them. It is generally true
that if there is a condition to be fulfilled, of
which one party would be aware and the other
would not, it is regarded as fair and proper
that the one who knows should be obliged to notify the other party affected thereby, and give
him a reasonable opportunity to react thereto.
545 P.2d at 1149.
If the trial court had acted equitably and pursuant to this
Court's directions, such damage would probably have been
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avoided,
This standard of "good faith" ha• been applied
jurisdictions as well.
Corp. Inc., 8

~

See e.g. Klin biel v. Conunercial C

u.c.c. Rep. 1099 (_10th Cir. 1971) ;. and

Ku kai

Morey, 541 P.2d 740 (_Alas.1975) in which the Alaska Suprerre
Court makes the following statement:
However, as a minimun requirement for the enforcement of such a provision, the party invoking the clause must reasonably and in good
faith believe that the prospect of payment or
performance has somehow been impaired.
545 P.2d at 1149.
These decisions are in agreement with this Court's decisioo
in Williamson.

Because the testimony at trial clearly

showed that the respondent Bank had acted wrongfuHy and
without justification in declaring itself insecure and
accelerating the notes, the appellants believe that the
trial court erred when it ruled that the appellants had not
sustained the burden of .proof under U.C.A. §70A-l-208.
Therefore, the appellants believe that the Findings of
Fact Numbers 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 and
Conclusions of Law Numbers 1, 21 6 and 10, were contrary to
the clear weight of the evidence at trial and they respect·
fully ask this court to reverse these Findings and Conclusions and to enter judgment for the appellants.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING TESTIMONY FROMT~
RECORD CONCERNING FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT IN THE FORMATION
THE SECURITY AGREEMENT WHICH ASSIGNED MRS. WOOLSEY'S rmE
IN A HOME IN PROVO.
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As additional security for the $115,000 loan which was
made to the appellants in June of 1974, Mrs. Sylvia Woolsey
assigned her interest in a home in Provo, Utah.

This pro-

perty is described on the assignment of contract attached
to the respondent's complaint and in the third Finding of Fact
in this matter. (R. 119, 45).

This home was awarded to Mrs.

Woolsey as part of.the divorce settlement of a previous
marriage.
During the course of the hearings and trial of this
matter, the appellants introduced a great deal of temtimoay
to show that Mrs. Woolsey's home was mortgaged.pursuant to
statements by Mr. Swenson that the mortgage was only necessary
to make the loan look good to the bank examiners, that tlae Jteiak
really didn't need the house, that there was no.way that her
interest in the home would be jeopardized, and that the Bank
had not made a practice of foreclosing on people's hames. (a.
458-466, 342-346).

For a synopsis of appellants' testimony in

this regard, see the answers to the respondent's interro9atory
*l, dated January 23, 1976 (R. 85-88), which answer is fouad
in the Record on Appeal at pages 76 to 78.
In her counterclaim, the appellant, Sylvia .Woolsey,

,

.;~O

,.,

specifically pled all of the facts set forth above and all.egecl ·
that such acts were intentional and constituted fraudulent
misrepresentation. (R. 59, 98-99).

In spite of these allegations

and the specific representations by counsel at a hearing (R.
238-241, 244-245), the Court ruled that such evidence was an

attempt to vary the terms of a written contract and therefore

ofLaw
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that this ruling was clearly erroneous
It is manifestly clear under Utah case law that evi
to show fraud in the inducement for execution of a cont ract
other written document is admissible as an exception to~
parol evidence rule.

The case of Mawhinney v. Jensen, llo

142, 232 P.2d 769 (1951) ruled that parol evidence is alwa~
admissible to show fraud, even though it has the effect of
varying the terms of the written contract.

This decisionu

in line with decisions of other states which have ruled on
matter.

See e.g. Davies v. Courtney, 11 Ariz.App. 248, 46J

P.2d 554 (1970); Smith v. Kalavitz, 515 P.2d 473 (Colo.197ll
Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Construction, Inc.

54-1 P,2d

1184 (Ida. 1975); Ruff v. Boltz, 252 Ore. 236, 448 P.2d54!
(1968); and Northern State Construction Co. v. Robbins, 76
2d 357, 457 P.2d 187 (1969).

All of these cases. stand for

rule previously cited and refelct the fairness of allowin91
party on opportunity to show that the terms or enforcement
of an agreement may be unjust because they were obtained
fraudulent means.
Without getting to the merits of whether or not' the
acts of the bank constituted fraud, the appellants believe
that the order of the trial court (described above) was cl
erroneous.

The court was required to consider that test'

and make a finding on the issue of fraud.

It is patently

that such evidence was not inadmissible as violative of the
parol evidence rule.
For the reasons set forth above, the appellants ask

courtLaw
toLibrary.
reverse
the
third
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trial court in this matter (R. 47) and to remand the matter
to the trial court for a determination of this issue by a
jury.
CONCLUSION

The appellants believe that the trial judge committecl

:

.

litiga~~:

several prejudicial errors during the course of this

. ~:~/

In striking the appellants' request for a jury trial, tbe
deprived them of the right to have the issues of .fact .i-e-

:·~ ·-

\"'

f,,f.

solved by a jury of their peers, a right which is ...,m'(il.:

'

,i._1... ~·-~ _.,,

by the Constitution and statutes of this state •.

,;,:.-.,·,_'

•••flie: "'

.,

... ·,,_,.~

questions of fact were thepredominant issues at tsia].#
trial judge had no discretion to deny the

..

~ '.'.'.~,,~-
appell~" ""

trial which had been properly requested.
committed prejudicial error by striking. the test:.hlal.r',
fraud in the making of a written agreement.

sucib

teet:f,liiM

is
be required to enter a finding on that issue.
··~' ,\~~

The appellants also assert that several finclillf!lllil' .

-~":?°"

trial court are against the clear weight of the eY.&M11m"""'
set forth herein, the evidence clearly showed that

~-

·

had made an oral agreement
note to March 1, 1976, and .that the respondent's
of that and others on the grounds of default was done
faith and has resulted in irreparable
For these reasons, the .appellants ask
Findings of Fact and Conclusions
to enter judgment in their favor or, in the alternative, to
,

"

thisLaw
matter
to the
trial provided
court byfor
further
hearin911
onService
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this matter before a jury.
DATED at Provo, Utah, this

--for:
& PETERSEN
Defendants-

MAILED two copies of the foregoing Brief to Heber Grant
Ivins, 75 North Center, American Fork, Utah

84003, this

/ (.,..f:/,,._ day. of November, 1976.
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